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Abstract
Empirical observations show that education helps to protect against labor
market risks. This is twofold: The higher educated face a higher expected
wage income and a lower probability of being unemployed. Although this
relationship has been analyzed in the literature broadly, several questions
remain to be tackled. This paper contributes to the existing literature by
looking at the above mentioned phenomena from a purely theoretic perspec-
tive and in a European context. We set up a model with search-and-matching
frictions, collective bargaining and monopolistic competition in the product
market. Workers are heterogeneous in their human capital level. It is shown
that higher human capital increases the wage rate and reduces unemployment
risks, which is consistent with empirical observations for European countries.
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11 Introduction
For years it has been observed that college graduates and higher educated face
lower unemployment rates than those less educated. The diﬀerences are persistent
over time and across countries. They even exist toward the end of the individuals’
working life cycle. And they persist throughout business cycles: The data tell us
that on average academics are exposed to lower unemployment risk in downturns
than less qualiﬁed individuals.1 Thus questions arise as to what extent education or
the formation of human capital aﬀects the unemployment risk, what the underlying
reasons are and how that connection evolves over the business cycle.
The salient model to explain equilibrium unemployment is the Mortensen-Pissarides
model with search and matching frictions on the labor market. Among the numer-
ous strands of the literature that build upon this model is the one about cyclical
variations in labor markets and macroeconomic implications in a general equilibrium
framework. The recent debate (driven for example by the papers by Shimer, 2005,
Hall, 2005, Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2005, Ebell, 2006) has focused on the ques-
tion to whether the Mortensen-Pissarides framework contributes to understanding
cyclical variations on the labor market, and, if so, to what extent. In the ambiguous
answers which researchers give to that question, the extent of rigidities in the labor
market and the calibration of the models both seem to play a crucial role.
This paper contributes to this strand of the literature by adding human capital
into a business cycle model with search and matching frictions on the labor market.
It therefore tries to extend the discussion in two ways: It aims at better under-
standing the skill-speciﬁc cyclical ﬂuctuations of labor market variables. Secondly,
since unemployment is a major problem in Europe the model is analysed not with
individual but with collective bargaining where workers in a ﬁrm are organized in a
union and bargain collectively with their employer over wages.
We focus our analysis on the eﬀects of general human capital, i.e. for example
the graduation from college, and abstract from analysing ﬁrm- and industry-speciﬁc
human capital. The purpose is to isolate the impact that general education, which is
relatively easy to signal from the job searcher to the ﬁrm, has on the unemployment
risk of the individuals. Human capital in this model follows a transition process with
depreciation and investment in education which is modeled like the transition for
physical capital in standard RBC models. The purpose is to establish a link between
human capital in this model to the role of physical capital in the RBC literature.
Given that the aim of this paper is to contribute mainly to understanding skill-
speciﬁc unemployment diﬀerences in Europe, the natural framework to use is that
of collective bargaining instead of individual bargaining which is standard in the
literature focusing on the US economy. The reason is that a fairly larger share of
workers in Europe are organized in a union. Whereas in the United States only 7.4%
of the employees in the private sector are organized in a union, 21% are organized
in Germany.
Furthermore, market regulation is higher in Europe. That is shown for example
by the OECD index for the degree of product market regulation, which is 1.7 for
1Some empirical observations are described in the Appendix.
1Germany and 1.4 for the United States2. This is the reason why we set up this
model not with the assumption of perfect competition on the product market but
in a framework that assumes monopolistic competition.
In this paper we attempt to set up the model closely to stylized European product
and labor market settings. We focus on the impact of labor and product market
institutions on the wage and unemployment rates for the diﬀerent skill levels.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the
literature concerning Europe’s unemployment problem and labor market frictions.
Section 3 presents the model and Section 4 describes the short run and long run
equilibriums. Section 5 discusses and concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper builds upon various strands in the literature: explanations for European
unemployment, search-and-matching models for the labor market and their ability
to account for cyclical movements, and the literature that analyses human capital
in the presence of labor market frictions and policy.
Among the works on European unemployment are Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)
who summarize explanations for both the level and divergence of European unem-
ployment rates. They classify possible causes of unemployment into three classes:
adverse economic shocks, adverse labor market institutions and the interaction of
adverse shocks with adverse market institutions. Among them, the authors argue
that only the last one can explain both the general increase in unemployment and
the large variation of unemployment across countries in Europe.
Structural changes in labor markets are also found to account for the secular ﬂuc-
tuations in unemployment, as a result high rigidities in the four largest continental
European countries, namely France, Germany, Italy and Spain can well explain the
inconsistence between high average unemployment and low country unemployment
rate in the majority of European countries (Nickell, 2002).
From early works which usually aim at building a complete framework includ-
ing both markets, it is clear that monopoly power in the product market impacts
the performance of the labor market (Cooper, 1990), and an overall rise in market
power throughout the economy leads to both higher unemployment and lower wage
(Abowd and Lemieux, 1993). However, Nickell (1999) questions the robustness of
such models and sets up his own one to capture workers’ rent-sharing pursuit under
collective bargaining. His model, though robust, generates a rather complicated
equilibrium and does not involve product market rigidities. These problems are ele-
gantly handled in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), who study the eﬀects of product
and labor market deregulations on rent reduction and redistribution, assuming mo-
nopolistic competition in the goods market and collective bargaining in the labor
market.
The United States is always regarded as the best example for its highly liberal-
ized product and labor markets, so a comparison between the US and EU countries
2Nicoletti, G. and S. Scarpetta (2005): “Product Market Reforms and Employment in OECD
Countries”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 472
2can help to analyse the case in Europe. This task is undertaken by Ebell and Haefke
(2004), who combine monopolistic competition, Mortensen-Pissarides-style match-
ing with individual wage bargaining. By developing a dynamic general equilibrium
model, they discuss two channels by which competition aﬀects unemployment: the
standard output expansion eﬀect and the overhiring eﬀects owing to individual bar-
gaining. These contributions to the literature are the basis for our model set-up
with collective bargaining and monopolistic competition in the goods market.
The main theoretic pillar of the labor market in our work is the Mortensen-
Pissarides styled search-and-matching frictions in the labor market (Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000)). However, the capability of the Mortensen-
Pissarides framework to explain the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacan-
cies has been challenged by Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005). Shimer (2005) argues
that for US data the standard search-and-matching model fails to generate the ob-
served standard deviation of the vacancy-unemployment ratio which is about 20
times larger than the standard deviation of average labor productivity. In contrast,
in his model set-up both variable are almost equally volatile. Also the model’s re-
sponses to shocks to average labor productivity and to the separation rate do not
correspond to the correlation between unemployment and vacancies observed in the
US data. Two main routes have been taken to tackle this question: Either some form
of wage rigidity is introduced into the model3, or the calibration strategy is modiﬁed.
We focus more closely on the second route, pursued for example by Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2006) and Ebell (2006). Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) come to the
conclusion that according to their calibration the model is indeed consistent with the
data. In their calibration strategy they concentrate on the two parameters worker’s
value of non-market activity and the worker’s bargaining power. Ebell (2006) solves
a decentralized competitive equilibrium model with labor market frictions in which
labor supply is elastic along the extensive margin, i.e. the participation. She then
analyses the model’s ability not only to account for labor market facts like the cycli-
cality of unemployment and vacancies but also for business cycle properties of the
macro aggregates. Her conclusion is that though Mortensen-Pissarides-type search
and matching frictions are an important cause for the ﬂuctuations of unemployment
and vacancies, they do not provide the full explanation. Mortensen and Pissarides
(2001) incorporate diﬀerent skill levels into a search-and-matching model to analyse
the eﬀects of labor market policies, e.g. the replacement rate, taxes and subsidies.
Our model - though closely related to theirs - diﬀers as we focus also on the interac-
tion between product and labor market institutions though our only labor market
policy variable is the unemployment replacement rate.
Various works consider the impact of human capital on labor market or macroe-
conomic outcomes. For example, Cuadras-Morato and Mateos-Planas (2006). They
analyse the impact of a skill-biased change in technology and a shock to employment
frictions in a model with endogenously determined education and focus on the US
labor market 1970-1990. Min Wei (2005) looks at a general equilibrium model with
human capital.
There are very limited literatures that consider the human capital issues within a
search and matching framework, while the existing ones mostly focus on the Ameri-
3For examples, Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2006, p.2
3can markets where wage bargaining takes place on the individual level. Our research
aims at explaining the diﬀerence between unemployment rates of various skill groups
in Europe, and our paper contributes to ﬁnd the link between labor market frictions,
a collective bargaining scheme and human capital.
3 The Model
In this section we present the basic model. The main assumptions here are that
there exists monopolistic competition in the goods market, the labor market is
modeled with Pissarides (2000) style of matching frictions and collective bargaining
for wages. Agents are heterogeneous in this model. They diﬀer in their level of
education/human capital which is deﬁned as a continuous variable. The individual
level of human capital is denoted by i, with i ∈ [0,1].
We divide time into two schemes: in the “short run” we take the number of ﬁrms
as given and examine the relation between wage and diﬀerent skill levels; whereas
in the “long run” entry cost matters to the ﬁrms in production, and the number of
ﬁrms becomes endogenous. We restrict our analysis to the steady state.
We also derived the model with an additional constraint for the government
according to which the amount of taxes raised on labor income must suﬃce to pay
the current-period unemployment beneﬁts. But we decided to present here the
model without taxes since the results are not aﬀected substantially by incorporating
the additional budget constraint but the model loses transparency. The model with
taxes will be provided by the authors upon request.
Details of the derivations of this model can be found in the Appendix.
3.1 Workers
The workers live inﬁnitely and supply labor to the ﬁrms. The time endowment is
normalized to 1. She can either work or search for a job, or go for education/skill
training to build up her human capital, or stay at home enjoying leisure. She stays
in the labor force while working or searching, and out of labor force when investing
in education or staying at home. At time zero, workers are endowed with human
capital hi ∈ (0,1). While by working type i worker earns the nominal wage W i(hi)
according to her individual level of human capital, she receives the unemployment
beneﬁt when searching for a job, which is the product of a constant b augmented
by her human capital level. Otherwise she receives ε as a subsidy while not being
in the labor force. Similar to Burda and Weder (2002), here we treat agents in job
search and pure leisure diﬀerently. As they emphasize this diﬀerence with respect to
labor market institutions and to essential factors in determining the business cycles,
we use this setup to assist that of other labor market institution: the frictions from
search and matching. As is mentioned above, agents are heterogeneous in this model,
each characterized by the level of individual human capital i, and i ∈ [0,1]. There
are countable workers with human capital hi
t who are addressed as type i workers.
Given the initial human capital, a representative type i worker seeks to maximize a








































t + (1 − φ
i)lnl
i
t where 0 ≤ φ
i ≤ 1
Two features of the utility function are worth mentioning. Firstly, human capital
enters workers’ utility function. Extensive empirical evidence suggests that human
capital positively aﬀects issues such as the health status, the eﬃciency in consump-
tion and in home production of non-market goods. Though not marketable, human
capital brings extra returns additional to what is realized through the labor market
(Wolfe and Haveman, 2001). Secondly, leisure is augmented by one’s human cap-
ital level, and people with a higher level of human capital are assumed to derive
larger utility from leisure. However, as consumption, human capital and leisure are
non-separable in the utility function, consumer’s risk attitude toward consumption
will vary over time and be aﬀected by the human capital she chooses to have and
the amount of leisure she enjoys (Heckman, 1976, Ortigueira, 2000). The weight φi,
which captures the individual preference on human capital and leisure, diﬀers from
worker to worker, whether they are of the same level of human capital or not. As
this parameter enters the equilibrium, workers optimal choices also diﬀer. I.e., as
some workers prefer investing more in education today so as to gain higher human
capital tomorrow, others might choose to stay at the same human capital level but
enjoy more leisure. As a result, in the next period the former workers will search
and be able to form matches with ﬁrms of higher human capital and enter the cor-
respondent wage bargaining process, while the latter ones stay at the same ﬁrms as
in the present period and re-enter the wage bargaining with the same ﬁrms.
At every period the representative worker has a normalized time endowment of
1, which is divided into work, search, education and leisure. When she works or
searches, she is part of the total labor force. This is to say, those searching are the
only people who are unemployed and covered by unemployment insurance, ui
t = si
t.






























where ε is the subsidy for agents out of labor force, hi
tb is the real unemployment
beneﬁt, τ is the cost of investment in education, Pt is the aggregate price level at
time t, while ei
t is the amount of education which contributes to new human capital.
The transition function of human capital is
h
i





















Solving the model yields two intertemporal conditions, which are the optimal
























By choosing to invest in education today, one has to give up leisure and pay
for the cost concerned. These losses are compensated by higher utility tomorrow,
resulting directly from higher human capital itself and indirectly via higher wage
income and a higher fall-back position (unemployment beneﬁt). Furthermore, the




























The left hand side of the intertemporal condition (22) shows the “price” caused
by search: it reduces leisure today directly and leisure tomorrow by creating a
possible job, both of which negatively eﬀect utility. The right hand side of the
equation are the “gains”, i.e., the positive diﬀerences in income both today and
tomorrow, which are used in consumption and contribute to higher utility.
As mentioned above, heterogeneous workers have diﬀerent preferences for leisure
and human capital (since φi is included in Ui
lt). With the same level of human
capital, some will stay in the same skill level (in the case of φi → 0), while others
move upwards to a higher skill scale. Workers with certain skill levels form a labor
pool for the equivalent ﬁrms, where search and matching take place. Moreover,
workers within one ﬁrm form a union to bargain the wage with the ﬁrm. According
to our setup, it is the workers who determine the size of labor force.
3.2 Labor Market: Search and matching
The labor market is characterized by a standard search and matching framework
(e.g. Pissarides, 2000). Unemployed workers ut and vacancies vt are converted into





Deﬁning labor market tightness as θt ≡ vt
st, the ﬁrm meets unemployed workers at




vt , while the unemployed workers meet vacancies at rate





All ﬁrms in the same sector are identical so that all jobs are identical in the
need of the same human capital, while industry-wide the wage is also the same. A
typical worker earns nominal wage W i(hi) when employed, and searches for a job
when unemployed. In the next period, she can become unemployed because either
her ﬁrm has exited the market with probability δ or she loses her previous job in the
ﬁrm with probability e χ(hi). This probability of losing job is a decreasing function
6in human capital, as higher-skilled workers are more productive and therefore ﬁrms
are more willing to keep them.
Suppose there is no correlation between these two sources of unemployment. In
all, they lose their jobs and become unemployed at the rate χ(hi) = δ+e χ(hi)−δe χ(hi).














where ZU is the value of being unemployed.
The unemployed worker receives (expected) real unemployment beneﬁt which is
the product of a constant b and the relevant level of human capital. (This setup
captures the empirical evidence that unemployed workers with higher skills attain
more unemployment insurance, as is the case in Germany, for example). In unit time














t is the probability for currently unemployed worker to ﬁnd a job in next
period. Therefore, the minimum compensation that an unemployed worker requires
to give up search equals the unemployment beneﬁt as well as the possible future
surplus once she will be employed.
To capture the fact that the currently unemployed workers are more likely to be
unemployed in the next period than those who have jobs now, we assume 1 − fi
t >
χ(hi
t). The surplus between the current values of being employed (if bargaining



























t as the expected gain from change of state, we reach the
































3.3 Products and Firms
Monopolistic competition is a key feature in the product market. Usually there
are two ways to model market competition: among industries or within industries.
The former way, such as in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), models the imperfect
competition among a ﬁnite number of industries, where each industry is also one
single ﬁrm and produces one diﬀerentiated product. Elasticity of substitution σ is
endogenized as a function of the number of industries and thus measure the degree of
competition. However, it is often argued that σ is more a ﬁxed preference parameter,
which is exactly the case in the latter approach: consumers have a certain ﬁxed
preference for each diﬀerentiated good i that is produced by an industry populated
7by a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms (Gal´ ı, 1995, Ebell and Haefke, 2004a). We follow the
second approach in assuming a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods where each is
produced by an industry populated by ni ﬁrms (ni ≥ 2). An increase in the number
of ﬁrms within one industry raises the degree of competition in this very industry,
as captured by an increase in the demand elasticity faced by each individual ﬁrm.
The ﬁrms within each industry compete in quantity (Cournot game). In period










t is aggregate output of good i and Y
i,−j
t is the average output of its ni −1



















































In the industry level equilibrium, we assume all ﬁrms play the same strategies.
Therefore each ﬁrm in industry i faces a demand elasticity which depends only on
















t is the total labor input. Human capital hi
t comes into the production by
augmenting the labor input. The parameter α ∈ (0,1) represents the decreasing
marginal return on labor.
Firms’ key decision is the number of vacancies. In each period ﬁrms open as
many vacancies vi
t as necessary in order to hire in expectation the desired number
of workers next period, while taking into account that the real cost to opening a
vacancy is κi. The nominal wage W i
t(hi
t) is the outcome of the wage bargaining


























































t + (1 − δ)βEtVt+1 (7)














































Equation (8) is derived from the demand function (6), equation (9) is the pro-
duction function as mentioned before, while equation (10) is the transition function
of labor.









The cost of searching for one worker must equal the value she contributes to the
ﬁrm, once the ﬁrm survives with the probability (1 − δ).








































The timing in the short run is as follows: the representative ﬁrm and its union
bargain for the wage; using the bargained wage and based on the current employ-
ment, the ﬁrm then chooses the vacancies to post so that the (possible) employment
next period is determined. Firms and workers have rational expectations and solve
the optimization problems by backward reasoning. Then the labor market outcomes
are realized.
3.4 Bargaining in the Labor Market
Nash bargaining is assumed, and the ﬁrm and its union choose wages for diﬀerent
tariﬀ groups in order to maximize the (log) geometric average of their surpluses from
employment. By choosing the opening of vacancies, the ﬁrm has “pinned down” the
possible employment for next period. Therefore in the collective bargaining, diﬀerent
wage scales are determined due to diﬀerent levels of human capital.
max
Wi (1 − η)ln(V
i − V
i





is the fall-back position of the ﬁrm whose outside option is not to produce,
thus gaining no proﬁt V
i
= 0. η indicates the bargaining power of the union, and
91−η is the ﬁrm’s weight. Obviously, the higher the η is, the union has more power
in the negotiation.
















The collective workers’ surplus can be obtained by multiplying the expression in




W i(hi) − bhiP




This section presents the general equilibriums in the short run and in the long run.
4.1 Short Run Equilibrium













































Combine the results from (14), (15), and the ﬁrm’s Euler equation (12), we can





























which in turn determines the output of this ﬁrm. From this equilibrium result, we











































































































(19) is the wage equation in the short run, which gives the industry-wide wage
in the industry with skill level i.
Wage increases in vacancy costs κi because with higher vacancy costs ﬁrms have
an increased incentive to keep the worker employed in order to save costs from post-
ing vacancies in future periods. Consequently, their bargaining position is slightly
weakened, and workers earn a higher wage as a result. The wage rate is also in-
creasing in the replacement rate for unemployment beneﬁts b. The reason is that
an increase in b also increases workers’ reservation wage and hence their position
in the collective bargaining. In contrast, the wage is decreasing in qi , the vacancy
duration hazard. The higher that hazard rate is, the easier it is for the ﬁrm to ﬁll
open vacancies, hence the stronger is their bargaining position.
4.2 In the Long Run
In the long run we can endogenize the degree of competition, which is captured by
the number of ﬁrms in each industry. In the long run ﬁrms may enter each market by
paying a real entry cost C (per unit of good). Entry of new ﬁrms will continue until
the proﬁt available from the market diminishes to zero due to increasing competition.





1−σt,symmetric ﬁrms set the










Firm makes zero proﬁt on each unit of goods after paying wage and entry cost. And
this cost should be “amortized” by proﬁts over all periods, and each period should
bear r
1+rC. The relative price can be derived from equation (18), while
Wi(hi)
P can
be derived from the short run wage function (19).
Equation (20) implicitly determines the number of ﬁrms within industry i, which
in turn determines the demand elasticity ξi. As demand elasticity ξi increases and
hence also the level of competition within an industry is intensiﬁed, proﬁt-based
11collective bargaining surpluses decrease4. The ﬁrm’s incentive to post vacancies is
reduced so that intertemporally the unemployment rate increases. A higher demand
elasticity and consequently intensiﬁed competition implicitly diminishes the ﬁrm’s
position in the collective bargaining process.




χ(hi) + fi =
χ(hi)










Apparently, through χ(hi), the skill-speciﬁc unemployment rate is negatively
correlated with the skill level. Ceteris paribus, the high-skilled sector experiences
lower unemployment rate than the low-skilled sector.
5 Discussion
5.1 Calibration
We calibrated the model to match German data, in particular the average unem-
ployment rate and the vacancy rate for the time span 1991-2006 (West and East
Germany), as well as the unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate, b. The prod-
uct price P is normalized to 1. The parameter value c associated with the cost of
education is also based on observables for education costs and opportunity cost in
German data. α, the parameter for the bargaining power is set to approximate the
collective bargaining scheme prevalent in Germany. The parameters speciﬁc to the
monopolistic competition framework are taken from Ebell and Haefke (2004b).
In our model the job destruction rate κ decreases with the skill level h. In this
ﬁrst step we deliberately choose a simple value for κ, namely κ = 1 − h2 . The
results are to be found in the Appendix as ﬁgure 2.
Parameter η σ b P β λ c κ α u v z
Value 0.5 2 0.3 1 0.95 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.25 0.1 1.2 1
As ﬁgure 2 shows the wage decreases with the number of ﬁrms in an industry,
and it increases - however with a much smaller slope - with the skill level of the
worker. The higher the number of ﬁrms in an industry, the more intense is the
degree of competition, and hence the lower the expected discounted revenue of the
ﬁrm as the price for a unit of the good decreases. Downward pressure on wages is a
consequence - its degree depending among others on the parameter β which reﬂects
the distribution of the wage bargaining power.
A higher skill level enhances workers’ productivity, which in turn increases the
ﬁrm’s scope to increase the wage.
4More detailed discussion can be found in Ebell and Haefke, 2004b, p. 19
12Note that the results depend crucially on how the skill-dependence of the job
destruction rate κ is modeled and on the wage bargaining process.
5.2 Results
In this paper we attempt to contribute to the theoretical explanations for the di-
vergence in wage and unemployment rates for agents with diﬀerent levels of human
capital. We set up a search-and-matching model with heterogeneous agents diﬀering
in a continuously deﬁned skill level, collective bargaining and monopolistic compe-
tition in the product market. We solve the model to derive conclusions about the
labor market performance of diﬀerently skilled agents.
In the comparative statics analysis we ﬁrst looked at the wage rate. We ﬁnd
that the wage rate increases in the level of human capital. The consequences in our
model are ambiguous as the direct impact is twofold: Firms face higher wage costs,
which in the presence of entry cost decreases the margin ﬁrms can earn, namely
increasing the threshold for ﬁrm entry. This in turn decreases the number of ﬁrms
in an industry and hence triggers a negative impact on the level of employment. On
the other hand, depending on the skill distribution in the population, the increasing
wage rate may lead to higher income and higher aggregate product demand, and
ﬁnally to increasing employment.
Besides, another implication of our model is that higher educated agents face a
lower probability of being ﬁred once they enter a match. A higher level of persistence
is thus introduced into the high-skill job matches relative to the low-skilled job
matches. Ceteris paribus, labor market tightness is increased in the high-skilled
segments of the market.
What is related to this is the third implication of our model, namely that the
unemployment rate is decreasing in the level of human capital. Broadly spoken, this
is consistent with empirical observations for European countries.
With respect to the impact of the degree of competition: As the competitive
pressure within an industry - i.e. in our model, the demand elasticity ξi increases -
the proﬁt-based surpluses to be shared in the collective bargaining decrease. Con-
sequently, ﬁrms have less incentives to open vacancies, and intertemporally the un-
employment rate goes down.
5.3 Multiple Equilibria
Our model may also be related to the discussion about the existence of multiple
long-run equilibria, or more precisely in this context: the existence of multiple nat-
ural rates of unemployment.5 Especially for Europa, the discussion is whether the
persistent increase in unemployment rates from the 1970’s to the 1990’s and beyond
can be interpreted as the transition from a low-unemployment equilibrium to a high-
unemployment equilibrium. Along this line of argument, a temporary shock caused
this persistent transition to a low-unemployment equilibrium in Europe.6 In a recent
5See Ortigueira (2006) for a brief overview.
6Cp. Ortigueira (2006), p. 2
13paper Ortigueira (2006) embeds search-and-matching frictions in the labor market
into a standard endogenous growth model. Human capital accumulation and labor
market participation is endogenous. As in this paper, his focus is on explaining
unemployment rates in European countries. Ortigueira (2006) expands the set of
mechanisms which can lead to multiple long-run rates of growth and unemployment:
The time-consuming activities in his model diﬀer in their human capital intensity.
That creates aggregate dynamic non-convexities yielding multiple long-run equilib-
ria. Ladr´ os-De-Guevara, Ortigueira and Santos (1999) also analyse an endogenous
growth model with human capital accumulation - but without search-and-matching
frictions. They show that the inclusion of leisure in the utility function may lead to
non-convexities in the optimization problem. An assumption that turns out to be
crucial for this is that education has no eﬀect on the quality of leisure, i.e. the level
of human capital does not change the marginal utility of leisure. The mechanics
however is similar to that in Ortigueira (2006): The level of human capital aﬀects
the time spent in the various activities in an asymmetric way. Hence, the dynamic
optimization problem may no longer be concave.7 For the sake of completeness:
Another potential source discussed in Ladr´ os-De-Guevara, Ortigueira and Santos
(1999) is an adjustment cost function that is jointly convex in investment and cap-
ital. However, we will not pursue this topic further but concentrate on the direct
eﬀect of the agents’ level of human capital.
Applied to our model: The above discussed sources of non-convexities related to
the level of human capital are potentially nested within our simple model. As we did
not specify the agents’ utility function in consumption and leisure, but restricted
the analysis to a general form of the utility function, the non-convexities described
in Ladr´ os-De-Guevara, Ortigueira and Santos (1999) may arise. However, a crucial
point is whether one is willing to make the assumption mentioned above that the
level of human capital does not change the marginal utility of leisure. In our basic
set-up we do not make that restriction. Agents in our model spent their time
working, searching for a job, investing in education or enjoying leisure. Here the
same mechanism may come to work as in Ortigueira (2006): Human capital is used
more intensively in the production sector - i.e. while agents spend their time working
(Li
t)- than in the time spent for job-search (si
t) or leisure (li
t). Additionally, if we do
not assume constant returns to education, the level of human capital does aﬀect the
productivity of the time spent for education (ei
t). Hence, if the level of human capital
increases, the production possibility set expands relatively more along the labor-
intensive sectors, and the ’education possibility set’ shrinks relatively if decreasing
returns are assumed. How asymmetric the results of this will be is determined by the
(initial) level of human capital.8 Consequently, aggregate dynamic non-convexities
may arise in our model.
In addition to Ortigueira (2006) and Ladr´ os-De-Guevara, Ortigueira and Santos
(1999) our model may be extended to look at skill-speciﬁc distributions of unem-
ployment probabilities in diﬀerent equilibria and transitions between them. More
precisely, our model allows us to look at the whole distribution of labor market risks
7Cp. Ladr´ on-De-Guevara, Ortigueira and Santos (1999), pp. 614
8Cp.Ortigueira (2006), p. 8
14- i.e. wages, the probability of being ﬁred, the unemployment rate, the average du-
ration of a match, etc. - in equilibria. Furthermore, we may analyse the transition
paths.
Given this paper’s early stage, however, a theoretical analysis of the equilibria,
stability and transitions is beyond the scope of this version.
6 Conclusion
This paper looks at the impact of education on labor market risks from a theo-
retic perspective and a European point of view. As our main focus is on better
understanding European skill-speciﬁc unemployment rates, we set up a model with
”European” stylized features: search-and-matching frictions in the labor market, col-
lective bargaining and monopolistic competition in the product market. Workers are
heterogeneous in their human capital level. The model yields that the wage rate in-
creases in the human capital level. Furthermore, education reduces unemployment
risks, reﬂected for example in lower lay-oﬀ probabilities. Consequently, high-skill
job matches are more persistent in this model than low-skilled job matches. Ceteris
paribus, labor market tightness is higher in the high-skilled segments of the labor
market.The unemployment rate is decreasing in the education level.
However the model and the results in this ﬁrst and preliminary version are very
stylized. An elaborate analysis of agents’ behavior, equilibrium conditions and prop-
erties, and calibration will follow. Furthermore, we do not explicitly consider exter-
nalities - from job search and human capital accumulation - in this early version.
Possible extensions - beyond the scope of this paper - are to enlarge the scope
of labor market policy by, for example, analysing the impact of education subsidies
or dismissal protection on the wage rates and unemployment rates. Another route
may be to distinguish the wage and unemployment responses to two diﬀerent types
of shocks, a technology shock and a shock to the matching process. This allows to
isolate the eﬀects of a skill-biased technological change on wages and unemployment
of the diﬀerent skill types. Obviously, a third route is to calibrate the model and




Figure 1: Skill-Speciﬁc Unemployment Rates9
blue: college degree, red: no formal degree
Table 1: Beneﬁts of Education in the U.S. and West Germany10
USA




Year UR high educ. UR low educ.
1975 1.2 6.1
1998 3.5 23.3
UR - Unemployment Rate
7.2 Calibration Results
Figure 2: Calibration a. for the job destruction rate χ
9Source: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit
10Sources: Cuadras-Morato/Mateos-Planas (2006) (USA), Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Ger-
many)
16177.3 Derivations
The representative worker i chooses the streams of consumption Ci
t, time in searching
si
t, and investment in education ei























































t is determined by yesterday’s search.
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7.3.1 Short Run Equilibrium

















































whereas in the steady state,
Z
i =
W i(hi) − bhiP
1 − β [fi − χ(hi)]
. (25)










(W i − hibP)Ni
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= 0













Taking derivative according to labor input yields
∂W iNi





























1 − β(1 − δ)[1 − χ(hi)]




























1 − β(1 − δ)[1 − χ(hi)]































This equation implicitly gives us the labor input for each ﬁrm level, which in
turn determines the output of this ﬁrm. Since this is the result from the bargaining
19equilibrium condition, from here we can derive the industry level, general equilibrium
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207.3.2 In the Long Run








































































χ(hi) + fi =
χ(hi)
χ(hi) + z (θi)
1−η
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